摘要：
Heather Gerken"s Jorde Lecture, Federalism 3.0, is characteristically sage and stimulating. She urges us to accept thoroughgoing state-federal integration and to recognize the possibilities of state power even when the state is acting as a "servant" to the federal government. Gerken also argues that we need a "new process federalism." Suggesting that we begin with the anti-coercion principle of NFIB v. Sebelius"s Spending Clause ruling, she calls on us "to rethink our account of the role judges play in policing state-federal tussles."1 But what counts as a state-federal tussle The very administrative and political integration Gerken embraces means that state-federal tussles will not necessarily be framed as such. To be sure, we will continue to see cases about state versus federal authority—-challenges concerning the reach of the Commerce Clause, the extent of federal preemption, and the federal government"s possible violation of anti-commandeering principles, to name a few. And sensitivity to "multidimensional problems involving resource allocation, governance, and politics"2 may point the way to sounder doctrine in these cases. If we limit our gaze to disputes about state versus federal authority, however, we will miss many of the most important federalism tussles: fights about the distribution of authority within the federal government. A variety of state challenges with important consequences for twenty-first century federalism have not concerned the roles of states and the federal government as cohesive units. They have instead turned on questions we usually put under a distinct separation of powers rubric: What is the scope of congressional versus federal executive power Has the President violated federal law, or has an administrative agency exceeded its statutory authority These fights, which tend to involve some (but not all) states challenging some (but not all) federal government actors, take federalism "all the way up."3 In prior work, Gerken has advocate
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