摘要：
Frictions may crucially influence the behavior of economies and policy design. As a consequence, using macroeconomic models that explicitly incorporate different types of frictions has become popular. In this dissertation, we move in that direction by incorporating either informational or financial frictions into different environments and analyzing their main implications. In the context of informational frictions, we focus on repeated moral hazard problems emerging from the non observability of agents' actions. With respect to financial frictions, we focus on agents' limited access to capital markets. In the first chapter, we study how the presence of moral hazard in labor contracts shapes the wage distribution in a search environment with on-the job offers. Since moral hazard induces residual wage dispersion as a mechanism to encourage workers' effort (incentives effect), one would intuitively argue that it unambiguously leads to more wage inequality. However, this reasoning overlooks the fact that the presence of moral hazard affects the worker's continuation values resulting from job offers, as well as the effort schedule. These changes are such that the wage profile associated with job offers shifts down and becomes flatter across productivity levels and educational levels which leads to less wage dispersion (wage offers effect). We calibrate the model to the U.S economy. The main result is that the wage offers effect more than offsets the incentives effect. In fact, eliminating the information friction increases wage dispersion by approximately 7%. In the second chapter, we consider the problem of unemployment insurance in a repeated moral hazard framework. Unlike the existing literature, in our environment, unemployed workers can secretly participate in a hidden labor market. This extension substantially modifies the properties of the optimal payment schedule. In particular, for workers with relatively low continuation values, the payment profile becomes fla
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