摘要：
This dissertation consists of three chapters on mircoeconomics. The first chapter, "Dynamic Information Disclosure" studies the dynamic information revelation by a sender, who wants to persuade a partially informed receiver to take a non-contractible action. This work identifies the nature of information of which the sender benefits from sequential disclosure. The optimal dynamic mechanism in two settings with different nature of information are characterized. This work also highlights the role of sender's commitment power in shaping her dynamic disclosure policy. We find that in general, when the sender cannot commit to future disclosure policy, she discloses too much information and does so too quickly. The second chapter, "Reputation Turnaround Through Voluntary Ownership and Management Turnover" (joint with Yuk-fai Fong, and Jin Li) studies the turnover of owners and managers in a reputation-reliant firm. It explains why ownership and management turnover can speed up the turnaround a firm's bad reputation, and improve shareholder value, even if the turnover is voluntary and the new owner or manager is no better at running the company. While there exists a literature on trading of company with good reputation, this work is the first to study the trading of company with a bad reputation. It identifies a novel, endogenous cost of corporate control, and provides a new explanation to the negative control premium puzzle in the empirical corporate finance literature. The analysis also sheds light on the optimal design of a firm's ownership structure, and provides a new rationale for increasing the transparency of manager compensation. The third chapter, "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice with Transitive Rationales" (joint with Keiichi Kawai) analyzes a sequentially rationalizable choice model with a transitive rationale and a standard preference. We provide a complete behavioral characterization of the model, and a partial identification result on the representation.
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