摘要：
Robert Nozick argues that the judgment as to whether any given distribution of holdings is just depends on whether those holdings were acquired or transferred justly. Except where theft or fraud require rectificatory steps, any attempt to redistribute anyone's holdings justly acquired is immoral because it violates the right of that person to his or her property. At the heart of Nozick's position is liberty, the natural freedom of a person to acquire and transfer holdings as he or she sees fit. Property acquired justly is owned absolutely; no one else has any claim to it. Ronald Dworkin argues that equality, not liberty, is the foundation of principles of distributive justice, and that the ideal of equality requires equal distribution of resources over lifetimes. Some inequalities in wealth which are due to unequal ambition or willingness to make sacrifices and take risks may be legitimate, but inequalities due to natural talent alone cannot be justified. I agree with Dworkin's egalitarian position in that equal human dignity is a powerful moral principle which demands that everyone have some minimal level of resources necessary to support that dignity and, therefore, may require a redistribution of holdings. Equality does not, however, require equal distribution of resources over lifetimes because there is no equal title to unclaimed resources not needed to support human dignity. I argue against Nozick that there is no absolute title to holdings, as his own weak version of the Lockean Proviso itself suggests. Further, I contend that a more-than-minimal state can arise, without violating people's rights, within the ideal framework of a community which provides certain essential safeguards to liberty; such a state has at least one distributive function to perform beyond its protective functions: redistribution of holdings when equal human dignity demands it. I conclude that, overall, Dworkin's egalitarian position on distributive justice is sounder than Nozick's.
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